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Farm household decisions under various tax policies: 




The study is devoted to the comparative static analysis and econometric estimation of farm 
household decisions under both standard and agricultural taxes. Accounting for labor market 
constraints a non-separable model is constructed implying increasing per-unit costs of 
accessing labor markets. To control for tax-induced adjustments related to labor market 
imperfections we compare the results to those derived from a separable approach, assuming 
perfect labor markets. Theoretical results suggest that most tax-induced responses are 
ambivalent mainly caused by shadow prices effects. Further, tax-induced effects differ 
between the two model versions. In particular standard taxes may imply production 
adjustments in the case of non-separability. Thus, income and value-added taxes are no more 
necessarily superior to agricultural taxes. Econometric analysis using individual household 
data from Mid-West Poland indicates remarkable responses to market surplus and input taxes. 
In contrast, standard and land taxes imply only negligible production adjustments. Thus, they 
seem to be superior, at least in the Polish case.  
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Farm household decisions under various tax policies: 
Comparative static results and evidence from household data 
 
Introduction  
There are at least two good reasons why taxation of agricultural households deserves special 
study and cannot simply be treated as a standard taxation problem of non-peasant economies. 
First, in many countries, especially in developing and transition economies, the use of both 
standard tax tools, value added and income taxes, is limited. It is often costly to tax 
transactions between producers and consumers by a value added tax, especially within the 
farm household or in informal markets. Furthermore, difficulties in observing a household’s 
annual income restrict the implementation of a well-defined income tax scheme (Ahmad and 
Stern; Newbery). Second, tax-induced farm household decisions may be reflected 
inadequately by conventional household and firm approaches, dichotomizing consumption 
and production decisions. In particular, when related markets are imperfectly competitive, 
production organization and consumption choice are jointly determined (Strauss). 
Extensive literature refers to the identification of feasible taxation tools for peasants’ 
households (‘agricultural taxes’). In this context, agricultural taxes are surrogates for standard 
taxes, in particular for income taxes. Prominent representatives include land taxes, output or 
input taxes, and poll taxes (Bird; Rao; Burgess and Stern). In addition, some papers 
investigate the analysis of tax-induced allocation and distribution effects within partial 
equilibrium frameworks (Atkinson) and dual-economy approaches (Sah and Stiglitz), as well 
as the application of optimal taxation models to peasant economies (Heady and Mitra; Stiglitz 
and Dasgupta; Munk). In contrast, studies focusing on the rigorous derivation of farm 
household decisions to tax policies are rare. Ahmad and Stern examine the farm household 
effects of several agricultural tax tools (marked surplus, gross output, and input taxes) within 
a simplified theoretical farm household approach. Chambers and Lopez analyze the 
implications of standard taxes (income, profit, and consumption taxes) on financially  
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constrained farm households within a dynamic approach. Lopez considers several income tax 
brackets by the estimation of farm household decisions, but does not explicitly examine their 
implications on consumption and production decisions.  
 This study is devoted to the theoretical analysis and empirical estimation of farm 
household decisions under both standard and agricultural taxes, assuming labor markets are 
imperfect. Binding hours constraints in off-farm employment may prevent a complete 
adjustment in agricultural labor markets (Benjamin). Family and hired labor may be imperfect 
substitutes in agricultural production (Deolalikar and Vijverberg; Jacoby). Also, farmers may 
have preferences towards working on or off the farm (Lopez). In addition, costs associated 
with labor market transaction, can explain why households have different relationships to the 
labor markets (Sadoulet, de Janvry and Benjamin).   
To account for imperfect labor markets, a non-separable farm household model is 
constructed. The model implies increasing per-unit costs in accessing both the market for 
hired on-farm labor and the market for off-farm family labor (Carter and Yao). Thus, the 
relevant wage rate is endogenously determined. The advantage of this methodology is 
twofold. First, the model accounts for several kinds of labor market imperfections, notably 
institutional restrictions (e.g. binding hours settled by collective agreements), variable 
transaction costs in accessing labor markets, or heterogeneity between hired and family labor 
on-farm and also between family labor on and off the farm (Low 1982, 1986). In particular, it 
differs from former approaches, which usually assume either a completely absent labor 
market or an exogenously fixed rationing of off-farm employment. Second, the approach is 
applicable for various labor market regimes, including the cases in which farms 
simultaneously hire on-farm labor and sell off-farm labor.    
We investigate the comparative static to compare production, consumption, and labor 
market effects caused by alternative tax policies. In detail, we analyze an income and value-
added tax, the main standard tax tools, as well as an off-farm income tax (‘wage tax’) and 
several agricultural taxes (market surplus, input and land taxes). To control for tax-induced 
adjustments related to labor market imperfections, we compare the results to those derived  
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from a separable approach assuming perfect labor markets. These comparisons allow us to 
examine basic rules regarding the optimality of the tax tools under consideration, at least from 
the efficiency point of view.
1 Since in a world of perfect markets standard taxes are superior 
to agricultural taxes and land taxes are superior to the other agricultural taxes, it seems to be 
interesting whether this ranking holds when labor markets are constrained.    
The econometric analysis is based on a full-specified non-separable farm household 
model and relies on individual household data from several regions in Mid-West Poland 
(1991-1994). Based on the estimated parameters we derive ‘tax elasticities’ quantitatively 
capturing tax-induced consumption, production, and labor market reactions. We compare the 
results with tax elasticities assuming separability. 
The Model  
To concentrate on the role of tax policies and labor market constraints, we construct a static 
model that ignores some aspects of farmers’ decisions, notably (price) risk (Finkelshtain and 
Chalfant; Fafchamps) and credit constraints (Chambers and Lopez). The model framework 
can cover both the case of imperfect and, with few rearrangements, perfect labor markets. The 
farm household is assumed to maximize utility derived from consumption and leisure subject 
to a technology constraint (2), a time constraint (3), and a ‘tax-corrected’ budget constraint 
(4). Therefore, farm households solve the following maximization problem:  
(1)  ( ) c U
c x,
max  
subject to  
(2) G x r ( , ) = 0 
(3)  0
h s
l l l l l T X X X C - + - - ³  
(4) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) {
( ) ( ) ( ) }
1 1 1 1
1
vat m m a a y ms c c a a a a a v v v
h s
l w l G G
P C PC P X P X C PC P X
g X f X E R
t t t t
t t
+ + £ - - + - + - + é ù ë û
- + - + -
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Here U(c) is the farm household’s utility function, which is assumed to be monotonically 
increasing and strictly concave. c is a vector of consumption goods consisting of market 
commodities (Cm), self-produced agricultural goods (Ca), and leisure (Cl).  
Production technology (2) is represented by a multi-output, multi-input production 
function  ( ) ( ) , 0 G x r = , which is assumed to be well behaved in the usual sense (Lau). Here 
PG xÎ  is a vector of production goods, expressed as netputs, and r is a vector of quasi-fixed 
factors. The farm household is assumed to produce market (Xc>0) and home-consumed (Xa>0) 
agricultural goods using variable inputs (Xv<0), labor (Xl<0), and the quasi-fixed factors land 
and capital.  
The farm household faces a time constraint (3) where Tl denotes the total time 
available. 
f h
l l l X X X = +  is the total of on-farm labor time subdivided into family labor 
) (
f
l X  and hired labor  ) (
h
l X . Furthermore, 
s
l X  indicates off-farm family labor and Cl the 
leisure of the family members. In general, four regimes of labor market participation are 
possible. First, the farm household sells family labor and hires labor at the same time. Second, 
farmers neither sell nor hire labor (autarky). Third and fourth, they either sell or hire labor. 
Farm household budget constraint (4) states that a household’s (‘tax-corrected’) 
expenditures (left-hand side of (4)) must not exceed its (‘tax-corrected’) total income (right-
hand side). Households may receive income from farming and from off-farm employment. In 
addition, it receives (E>0) or pays (E<0) transfers, which are determined exogenously. Here, 
; , , , i P i m a c v =  denote the exogenous consumer and producer prices before tax, and  j t  are the 
parameters of tax policies to be analyzed. Note, to analyze the impact of the market surplus 
(tms) and value-added taxes (tvat), it becomes necessary to differentiate between net sellers 
and net buyers of the self-produced agricultural goods. In particular, due to the empirical 
evidence in our data base, we suppose that the household is a net supplier ( 0) a a X C ->.  
In detail,  vat t  denotes the value-added tax. Legally and in non-peasant households, 
total monetary expenditures are subject to value-added taxes. For farm households, however,  
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internal transfer of self-produced agricultural goods cannot be observed by tax authorities. 
Thus, only the expenditures for market commodities ( ) m m P C  are subject to the value-added 
tax. The basis of the income tax ( ) y t  is the household’s monetary income, including profits 
from farming  ( ) ( )
h
c c a a v v l P X P X P X g X + - - , where  ( )
h
l g X  denotes hired labor costs (see 
below), and also off-farm labor income  ( ) ( )
s
l f X , and transfers ( ) E . Due to the virtual 
absence of record keeping, farm income is often not taxable and thus only incomes from off-
farm employment can be taxed by a wage tax ( ) w t . Similarly, market surplus, input, or land 
taxes are applied as surrogates for an income tax. The base of the market surplus tax  ( ) ms t  are 
revenues from sales of agricultural goods  ( ) ( ) c c a a a P X P X C + - , assuming internal transfers 
are not taxable. Expenditures for commercial inputs ( ) v v P X  such as fertilizer and chemicals 
are subject to the input tax ( ) v t  and the market value of land ( ) G R  is taxed by a land tax 
( ) G t . 
To consider labor market imperfections, revenues from off-farm employment and 
hired labor costs are conceptualized as functions of supplied  ( )
s
l X f  and hired  ( )
h
l X g  labor 
time. If perfectly competitive labor markets are to be assumed, then the functions are both 
linear, with  ( ) .
s
l l f PX =  or  (.)
h
l l g PX = . Hence, marginal off-farm income or marginal costs 
for hired labor are equal to the exogenously given wage rate (Pl). In this case, the farm 
household model is separable (between production and household decisions).  
In contrast, when labor markets are assumed to be imperfectly competitive both 
functions become nonlinear with the following properties:  (.) 0
s
l f X ¶ ¶ > ; 
2 2 (.) 0
s
l f X ¶ ¶ <  
and   (.) 0
h
l g X ¶ ¶ > ;
2 2 (.) 0
h
l g X ¶ ¶ > , respectively. Now, off-farm income is an increasing 
and strictly concave function of supplied labor time. Analogously, the costs of hired labor are 
an increasing and strictly convex function of hired labor time. In this case, the price of labor 
and leisure (Pl) is endogenously determined and thus the farm household model is non- 
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separable. The production and consumption decisions are simultaneously determined by the 
stationary solution of the equation system (1) to (4).  
As mentioned above (see ‘Introduction’), this framework is applicable for several 
kinds of labor market imperfections. In particular, it accounts for labor market imperfections 
which lead to a decreasing price effectively received for each further unit of off-farm 
employment and to an increasing price effectively paid for each further unit of hired labor 
time. Hence, such conditions can be interpreted as increasing per-units costs of accessing 
labor markets, or in other words as increasing transaction costs.  
Increasing transaction costs associated with working off the farm may be caused by an 
increasing heterogeneity between on- and off-farm family labor. With a growing migration 
household members are first transferring to the ‘best jobs’ followed by the ‘next best jobs’ 
and so on (Low 1982, 1986). Similarly, increasing search and transportation costs may lead to 
a decreasing net wage rate. Increasing per-unit costs of hired labor may result from increasing 
search, supervision, and monitoring activities. It seems to become more and more difficult to 
find the ‘right’ staff for the different and often farm-specific areas of production. Moreover, 
with increasing staff and hired labor time, respectively, the supervision and monitoring per-
unit of hired labor may become more costly. Similarly, the existence of land-specific 
experience may lead to a decreasing substitutionality between family and hired labor. Hired 
labor becomes less productive and the costs for a standardized hired labor unit increase.  
Note that the approach could additionally incorporate fixed costs of transactions that 
are invariant to the traded quantity, but also could affect the farm household’s decision to 
participate in markets (Sadoulet, de Janvry and Benjamin for the labor markets; Goetz as well 
as Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry for food markets; Skoufias, and Carter and Yao for the land 
market). Fixed transaction costs may include bargaining and negotiation efforts and 
transportation costs, often taking place once per transaction, and are invariant to the level of 
transaction.  
Taking fixed costs of accessing labor markets into account might mainly contribute to 
the explanation of the different labor market participation regimes. This paper does not  
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investigate the analysis of different market participation regimes and thus we do not explicitly 
model fixed transaction costs within the theoretical framework. We assume that the farm 
household hires on-farm and supplies off-farm labor simultaneously. Without any problems, 
the model is applicable for all other market participation schemes. In contrast, within the 
empirical analysis the possible occurrence of fixed cost in accessing the labor market is taken 
into account, in particular to identify the ‘true’ labor market conditions.  
The stationary solutions to the maximization problem (1)-(4) determine the optimal 
quantities of consumption and production goods, and the allocation of time, assuming there 
exists an interior solution ( 0 , , > m f l ; , , , , , , 0
h s
m a l c a l l C C C X X X X > , and  , 0 l v X X < ).  
(5)  ( )
* . 0 i i U P l - =          { } , , i m a l Î  
(6)  ( )
* . 0 i i G P f l + =          { } , , , i c a v l Î  
(7) 
* * * (.) (.) l l l f P g = =        
(8) 
{ } ( ) ( )
{ }




i i l l G l i
i c a v i m a
P X g X f X R E P C
Î Î
- + - + - = å å  
(9) G x r ( , ) = 0           




l l l C X X X T  
Here  0 , > f l  are Lagrangian multipliers associated with the budget and the technology 
constraints, respectively.  l i i f G U , ,  and  l g  represent the first derivatives of the corresponding 
utility, production, and labor market functions. 
*
l P m l =  denotes the unobservable internal 
wage in the case of non-separability, where m  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with 
the time constraint. In the separable version, 
*
l P  indicates the exogenous ‘tax corrected’ wage 
rate. Furthermore,  ( )
* 1 Cm vat m P P t = +  and  ( )
* 1 Ca ms a P P t = -  represent the (‘tax-corrected’) 
decision prices for consumption goods. The decision prices for production goods are indicated 
by  ( )( )
* 1 1 Pc y ms c P P t t = - - ,  ( )( )
* 1 1 Pa y ms a P P t t = - -  and  ( )( )
* 1 1 Pv y v v P P t t = - + . In addition,  
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the following definitions hold: 
*
G G G R R t = ,  ( ) ( )( ) ( )
* . 1 1 . y w f f t t = - - , and  
( ) ( ) ( )
* . 1 . y g g t = - .  
Comparative Static  
To facilitate the comparative static analysis we transform the primal decision problem (1)-(4) 
into a dual representation (Diewert). First we define a dual restricted profit function 
{ }
* * ( , ) max | ( , ) 0
x p r p x G x r P º = , where 
* p  is the (decision) price vector of the production 
goods and 
* ( , ) p r P  is the maximal profit. Following Hotelling’s lemma, the optimal 
quantities of production goods are defined by  { }
* * (.) ( , ); , , , i i P X p r i c a v l ¶P ¶ = " Î .  
Further, we can define a dual expenditure function  { }
* * ( , ) min | ( )






* p  is the (decision) price vector of the consumption goods and 
￿
U  is the obtainable 
utility level. According to Shepard’s lemma, we can derive the Hicksian compensated demand 
function, with  { }
* (.) ( , ); , ,
H
i i e P C p U i m a l ¶ ¶ = " Î
￿
. Substituting the indirect utility function 
* ( , ) V p Y  for 
￿
U , it holds that 
* * * ( , ( , )) ( , )
H
i i C p V p Y C p Y º . Thus, the Hicksian demand at 
utility 
* ( , ) V p Y  is the same as the Marshallian demand at income Y. 
For the non-separable model version, condition (7) defines the off-farm labor supply 
* ( , )
s s
l l l j X X P t =  and the demand for hired labor 
* ( , )
h h
l l l j X X P t =  as implicit functions of the 
endogenous labor price ( )
*
l P  and of those tax parameters ( ) , y w t t  that (directly) affect the 
general wage level and hence the position of the labor market functions
2.  
 Substituting the defined dual and implicit functions into the time constraint (10) results 
in: 
(11)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * , , , , 0
h s
l l P llj llj lC TX p rXP X P C p Y t t + + - - = ,  
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * . . . . .
h s h s
l l l l l l G Ci i
i CG
Y g X f X P T X X R E P C
Î
é ù é ù é ù = P - + ++- - + = ë û ë û ë û å .   
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Equation (11) implicitly defines the shadow wage  ) (
*
l P  around the optimal solution of 
the non-separable model. Hence,  ( )
* * * , , , , , l l G j P p r T E R c t =  is an implicit function of 
exogenous decision prices for consumption and production goods (
* p ), fixed resources  ) (r , 
total time available (Tl), land tax payments (RG
*), and those tax parameters ( ) | , j j y w t = , 
which directly affect the wage level. Note that the impact of the other tax policies to the 
shadow price is already reflected by ‘tax-corrected’ exogenous prices. 
Based on the above defined functions, we can derive farm households’ consumption, 
production and labor market responses ( ) , , ,
s h
i i l l Z C X X X =  to changes in any of the designed 
tax parameters ( ) | , , , , , j j y w ms v r vat t = . In the case of non-separablility, we can decompose 
the tax-induced farm household reactions for any arbitrary tax policy into the following two 







j j l j P const
P Z Z Z
P t t t
=
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= +
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
 . 
The first term (direct component) on the right-hand side represents the supply or demand 
reactions to changes in the designed tax parameters assuming a constant endogenous labor 
price (Pl
*). The second term (indirect component) represents the adjustments to the changes in 
the internal wage rate caused by changes in the same tax parameter.  
In order to determine the indirect component of the non-separable version, we have to 
derive the tax-induced shadow price adjustment from equation (11), applying the implicit 
function theorem (de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet):  
(13)  ( ) ( )
( )
*
* j j j j
j
h s H
l l l l lY l
l h s H
j ll ll ll ll
X X X C C P
P
X X X C








The numerator on the right-hand side represents the change in the time allocation due to 















= å  denotes tax-induced on-farm labor  
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adjustment, and  ( ) * . j
l
h h
l l j P const
X X t t
=
= ¶ ¶  and  ( ) * . j
l
s s
l l j P const
X X t t
=
= ¶ ¶ , respectively are the 

















= å  and  ( ) lY l C C Y Y = ¶ ¶ Y  are the tax-induced substitution and income 
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å  reflects 
the budget effects.  
The denominator indicates the change in the time allocation caused by changes in the 
internal wage rate. Here, 
* 0 ll l l X XP = ¶ ¶ > ,  ( ) ( )
2 * 2 * 1 . 0
h h h
ll l l l X X P g X ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ = > , 
( ) ( )
2 * 2 * 1 . 0
s s s
ll l l l X X P f X ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ = <  and 
* 0
H
ll l l C C P = ¶ ¶ <
4. Note that the denominator 
is always positive given convexity of P(.) and the concavity of e(.) in prices, and given the 
convexity of g
*(.) and the concavity of f
*(.) in traded labor. 
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 denotes the corresponding indirect component. The last 
two equations (16) and (17) represent farm households adjustments regarding the supply of 
family labor off-farm and the demand for hired labor, respectively. Here, the respective first 
terms (right-hand side) are direct tax-induced adjustments, whereby the second terms indicate 
the respective indirect components (see above).  
Assuming separability, in most cases farm households’ economical adjustments 
coincide with the direct components of the non-separable version. This is particularly true for 
all production and consumption adjustments to changes in tax parameters which do not affect 
the general wage level ( ) | , , , j j ms v r vat t = . In contrast, they do not coincide with the direct 
components of the separable version in the case of an income tax or a wage tax ( ) | , j j y w t =  
since both directly affect the general wage level and hence shift the labor market functions. 
Regarding the labor markets, the comparative static of the separable version differs from the 
direct component of the non-separable version for all tax policies under consideration. In the 
case of separability, labor market adjustments residually result from the time constraint, after 
production and consumption decisions are made:  ( ) l l l j T X C ¶ ¶t + - .   
In accordance with the equations (13) to (17), we derive the complete comparative 
static for all tax instruments mentioned above,
5 summarized in the following two tables
6. In 
particular, we compare the tax-induced adjustments within the non-separable version with 
those of the separable framework.  
include table 1 and table 2 
Comparative static results suggest that when labor market imperfections occur (table 1) most 
tax-induced allocation effects are theoretically unclear, mainly caused by undetermined or  
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partly counteracting shadow price components. Only a wage tax (tw) and surprisingly a land 
tax (tG) might clearly lead to an expansion of production. Also, tax-induced consumption 
effects are strictly speaking theoretically unclear. However, assuming consumption goods are 
net-substitutes, a decreasing demand for market and self-produced consumption goods seems 
probable in some cases. In addition, nearly all tax induced labor market adjustments are 
theoretically undetermined.  
 In particular, the analysis reveals some unexpected results in case of non-separability 
(table 1). In contrast to several other studies, we find that standard taxes, that is income (ty) 
and value added taxes (tvat), as well as land taxes (tG) thoroughly could imply production 
adjustments. Analogously, increasing agricultural taxes, as market surplus (tms) and input (tv) 
taxes, may lead to a higher demand of some consumption goods. Increasing agricultural taxes 
might imply a higher internal valuation of labor, and thus lets the household members to 
substitute leisure for other consumption goods. Similarly, a value added tax (tvat) theoretically 
might lead to a higher consumption of commercial goods, which are themselves subject to the 
tax. Also the reduction of hired labor as a result of an increased wage tax (tw) appears to be 
surprising. However, a lower internal wage rate implies that family labor becomes less 
expensive compared to hired on-farm labor. Therefore hired labor will be substituted as long 
as their marginal cost equals the (reduced) shadow wage.       
Furthermore, the analysis indicates that tax-induced farm household effects may differ 
between the non-separable (table 1) and the separable (table 2) model version. That is, labor 
market imperfections may have an impact on tax effects. In particular, production and 
consumption adjustments might differ for all agricultural taxes (tms, tv, tG) and the value-
added tax (tvat), while an income tax (ty) may imply different production, but similar 
consumption adjustments. The wage tax (tw), however, probably induces similar production 
and consumption responses within the two model versions. Labor market adjustments might 
theoretically differ between the two model versions for market surplus (tms) and input (tv) 
taxes.
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Finally, comparative static analysis reveals that basic results of optimal taxation and 
agricultural taxation literature have to be modified in part. In particular, since income and 
value-added taxes could imply production effects, they are no more necessarily superior to 
agricultural taxes in the sense of the optimal taxation theory. One of the basic results of the 
optimal taxation literature is that theoretically optimal taxation policies usually consist of a 
well-defined combination of consumption (value added) and income taxes, assuming those 
taxes imply no production effects. Diamond and Mirrless point out in their fundamental work, 
that production efficiency is desirable within an optimal taxation system, although a full 
Pareto optimum is not achieved, since commodity taxes imply that marginal rates of 
substitution are not equal the marginal rates of transformation. Analogously, since the 
presence of labor market imperfections implies that a land tax can lead to production 
adjustments and efficiency losses, it is no more clearly superior to market surplus or input 
taxes.  
Empirical Specification 
To clarify the direction and quantify the extent of the tax-induced farm household reactions, 
we estimate a fully-specified non-separable farm household model. The data rely on a farm 
accounting survey undertaken in various regions in Mid-West Poland. Based on the estimated 
parameters we derive tax elasticities which capture tax-induced production, consumption and 
labor market reactions.  
The farm household model is specified as follows. The production decisions are 
represented by a multi-output, multi-input profit function from the symmetric normalized 
quadratic
7 (SNQ) form (Diewert and Wales 1987, 1992; Kohli). The SNQ profit function is 
flexible. To ensure global convexity, we apply the method proposed by Koebel, Falk and 
Laisney (2000, 2003) (see below). The consumption decisions of the farm households are 
specified by an AIDS consumer demand system (Deaton and Muellbauer). The AIDS is 
flexible, but not necessarily concave. Therefore, we have to check concavity. Imperfectly 
competitive labor markets are represented by a convex cost function for hired labor and by a 
concave income function for off-farm family labor.   
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 The econometric estimation of the proposed model is carried out in three steps. First, 
we estimate the cost function for hired labor  ( ) ( )
* h
l g X  and the off-farm income function 
( ) ( )
* s
l f X  as two nonlinear regression equations:  
(18)  ( )
* h h
n h ln h n g X
a
b k u = + +
 
  
(19)  ( )
* s s
n s ln s n f X
a
b k w = - + ,  
Here n indicates the observation and Xl
h and Xl
s indicate the farm-specific quantities of traded 
labor. b , a and k  are the parameters to be estimated, where k accounts for fixed costs of 
assessing labor markets, and u and w  represent the random error terms. Based on the 
estimated parameters, we can calculate the ‘basic’ inte rnal wage (Pl
*) for each individual farm 
household, with:  ( )
1 * h h h




=  for hired labor and  ( )
1 * s s s




=  for supplied off-
farm labor, respectively. 
 Unfortunately, the estimation results show remarkable price differences between hired 
and supplied labor for those households that both hire and sell labor, neglecting the fact that in 
equilibrium marginal cost of hired on-farm labor has to be equal to marginal off-farm income. 
In all cases, the prices for supplied labor ( )
* s
ln P  are higher than those for hired labor ( )
* h
ln P . 
This might be the result of unobservable transaction costs (e.g. search, supervision, or 
transportation costs), which increase the internal value of hired labor, and decrease the 
internal value of supplied labor. Thus, the occurrence of unobservable transaction costs might 
offset the ‘observed’ differences between the internal prices of hired on-farm and supplied 
off-farm labor. Hence, 
* * * h h s s
ln ln n ln n P P P = +L = -L , where 
h
n L  and 
s
n L  denote the unobserved 
per unit costs of accessing labor markets. Since there is no further information available, it is 
assumed that the unobserved per unit cost of hiring on-farm and of selling off-farm labor are 
equal, with:  ( )
* * 1
2
h s s h
n n ln ln P P L = L = - . Thus, the ‘adjusted’ shadow prices are simply defined 
as the mean of the prices for hired and supplied labor, with  ( )
* * * 1
2
h s
ln ln ln P P P = + .  
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 For farm households that either (only) sell or (only) hire labor, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the relations between the unobservable transaction costs and the ‘observed’ 
internal wages are similar to those households that both supply and hire labor.
8 Considering 
the ratios of the average unobserved transaction costs and ‘observed’ labor prices of 
households that sell and hire labor at the same time with 
* s s
l P L  and 
* h h
l P L , the ‘adjusted’ 
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= L , respectively, 
indicate the calculated unobserved transaction costs. Finally, for farms that neither sell nor 
hire labor (autarky) the internal wage rate is defined as the average ‘adjusted’ shadow wage of 
the other households in the sample.   
Considering the calculated ‘adjusted’ wage rates, in the second step we estimate the 
four netput equations  { } ( ) ; , , , i X i c a v l =  from the SNQ profit function
9: 
(20) 
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* indicates the producer price indices 
and Xi; i ={c, a ,v, l}ÎPG denotes the aggregated net outputs and net inputs. R represents the 
quasi fixed factors land (G) and capital (K). a, b, d, g  are the parameters to be estimated, and 
x represents the error terms. To identify all b coefficients, we impose the following 
restrictions: 




= " å , where 
*
J P  are the mean prices (Diewert and Wales 1987, p. 
54).  
In the last step we estimate the household’s consumption decisions via an AIDS 
consumer demand system consisting of three commodity groups: purchased commodities  
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(Cm), self-produced consumption goods (Ca), and leisure (Cl). The following specification is 




in i ij jn i in
j CG n
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2
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Ã = + + å å å  . 
Here,  { }
* ; , , i ii W P C Y i m a l = =  are the budget shares, where Y  indicates the full income. Ã 
is the translog consumer price index, and PI
* indicates the consumer price indices of the 
aggregated commodity groups (Ci; i={m, a, l}ÎCG). a, b, and g  are the parameters to be 
estimated
10, and w represents the error terms.   
Data and Empirical Results  
Data used for the estimations are based on an accounting survey of a four year-panel (1991-
1994) of agricultural households in several regions around Poznan (Mid-West Poland). The 
data were collected and published by the Institute for Agriculture and Food Industries 
(IERiGZ) in Warsaw. Initially, the data consists of an unbalanced panel of about 650 farms 
over the observation period. For this study, a balanced panel of 76 farms per annum is 
selected, i.e. we considered only those farms that were in the sample each year. 
On the production side, pure market goods (Xc) consist of cereals, sugar beets, rape, 
and potatoes, while milk, beef, pork, poultry, and eggs were considered as home-consumed 
production goods (Xa). Variable inputs (Xv) comprises fertilizer, chemicals, seed and feed.  
Labor (Xl) includes both family and hired labor. Land (G)
11 and Capital (K) are considered as 
a quasi-fixed factors. On the consumption side, Cm includes all purchased consumption goods, 
in particular nonfood including housing. Ca corresponds conceptually to the self-produced 
livestock products (Xa). The amount of leisure (Cl) is determined by calculating the yearly 
available time (Tl) of households (household members older then 15 years ´ 16 hours ´ 365 
days) minus on-farm (Xl
f) and off-farm (Xl
s) family labor. Appendix table A1 gives an 
overview of main sample characteristics.  
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Before beginning to present and interpret the main results, namely the tax elasticities, 
we use appendix tables A2 to A4 to give an overview of the estimated parameters, the 
goodness of fit, and the theoretical consistency of the estimated model. All estimations and 
calculations are carried out by the (free) software “R” (Ihaka and Gentleman, see also 
http://www.r-project.org). 
Parameter Estimates, Goodness of  Fit, and Consistency   
We found most parameters of the labor market function ((18) and (19)) and nearly all 
parameters of the demand system ((21) and (22)) of statistical significance. In particular, the 
estimated ah is significantly greater than 1, indicating convexity of the cost function for hired 
labor. The estimated as lies between 0 and 1, revealing concavity of the off-farm income 
function, but is not significantly different from one.
12 Since at the production side (20) the 
estimated coefficients of the netput equations did not satisfy convexity of the profit function, 
we restrict the model retaining convexity (see below). However, this procedure does not 
provide standard errors.
13 When evaluating the goodness of fit of the estimated farm 
household approach, we found R
2 values between 0.04 and 0.86. While the ‘fit’ appears to be 
satisfactory for the labor market equations with a R
2 of 0.73 and 0.85, and the (restricted) 
netput equations (R
2 values ranging from 0.50 to 0.83), the calculated coefficients of 
determination of the budget share equations are relatively low (0.04, 0.38 and 0.15). However, 
we find R
2 values explaining quantities to be consumed between 0.25 and 0.92.   
Theoretically consistent estimations require, that the regularity conditions (adding-up, 
symmetry, homogeneity, monotony, and convexity and concavity, respectively) have to be 
fulfilled. The symmetry and the homogeneity (AIDS) condition are enforced by parameter 
restrictions, but we have to check monotony as well as convexity and concavity. Monotony of 
the profit and expenditure function can be easily checked via the signs of the netput quantities 
and budget shares, respectively. We found that the monotony conditions are fulfilled in nearly 
all cases (100 % at the consumption side and 98% at the production side).  
Finally, we check convexity and concavity via the semi-definiteness of the Hessian’s 
of the profit and expenditure function, respectively. The expenditure function is at almost all  
  18 
data points (91%) concave. In contrast, the estimated coefficients of the netput equations did 
not satisfy convexity of the profit function. Thus, we enforce convexity with a new procedure 
proposed by Koebel, Falk, and Laisney (2000, 2003). In a first step, we tried to impose 
convexity by the Cholesky decomposition (Lau). Since the estimation of the restricted non-
linear netput equations did not converge, we chose the method suggested by Koebel, Falk, and 
Laisney. It is based on the minimum distance and asymptotic least squares estimation 
(Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon; Kodde, Palm, and Pfann), and is asymptotic equivalent 
to a (successful) direct estimation with convexity imposed. First, the unrestricted (linear) 
netput equations are estimated as SUR system, and the resulting coefficients are used to 
calculate the unrestricted Hessian matrix. Second, the weighted difference between this 
unrestricted and a restricted Hessian is minimized by a nonlinear Newton-type optimization 




Tax elasticities presented here reflect the relative change of the respective economic variables 
with respect to the change of the analyzed taxes. In order to separate the impact of labor 
market imperfections, we derive tax elasticities assuming non-separability as well as 
separablility. We compute the tax elasticities as a function of the relevant price and income 
elasticities (see annex tables A5 and A6), which are based on the underlying estimated 
parameters and calculated using the sample mean values of the relevant variables. Strictly 
speaking, ‘tax elasticities’ indicate the percentage change of the economic variables (Z) when 
the tax increases by one percentage point.   
The tax elasticities correspond to the differentials in the comparative static analysis.
15 
Analogously to equation (12), tax elasticities within the non-separable framework compound 
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Here  ( ) , , ,
s h
i i l l Z C X X X =  indicates the consumption and production goods, as well as 
supplied off-farm and hired on-farm labor, and  ( , , , , , ) j j y w ms v r vat t =  are the tax parameters 
under investigation.  
 Table 3 gives an overview of the tax elasticities and shadow price elasticities within 
the non-separable framework. We find unexpected low production effects and a mediocre 
reduction in consumption as a result of an increasing income tax (ty). Only the adjustments 
regarding the labor markets are relatively large: Farmers will increase their supply of off-farm 
labor (2.19) and hire less on-farm labor (-1.27). The low tax-induced production response can 
be explained by both the fact that the tax induced shadow price elasticity (1.32) is not very 
different from one and, in addition, the very low labor price elasticities of output supply and 
input demand. The first argument needs to be further explored (see also section ‘comparative 
static’). An income tax directly affects all prices apart from the labor price of the output 
supply and the input demand functions with ‘tax-price elasticities’ of one. With a tax induced 
shadow price elasticity close to one, all production prices approximately change in the same 
proportion. Thus, given the homogeneity condition of output supply and input demand 
functions, the income tax does not affect the production plan to a remarkable extent.   
include table 3 
An increasing taxation of off-farm labor (tw) leads to an increasing subsistence character of 
the farm households. Labor market transactions both for hired (-2.84) and supplied (-2.04) 
labor will be reduced to a great extent. Further, the consumption of self-produced food and 
market commodities decreases while the demand for leisure slightly increases. On the 
production side, we find a slight increase in the output supply and input demand, which seems 
to be the result of very low labor price elasticities of output supply and input demand. Note, 
that the exclusive taxation of off-farm labor corresponds to the tax policy that has existed in 
Poland’s agricultural sector during the observation period ( 1991-1994).  
The most important and relative homogenous allocation effects will be induced by a 
market surplus and an input tax (tms and tv). We find the general reduction of production  
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activities with elasticities ranging from -0.05 up to -0.35, a sharp decreasing consumption of 
purchased commodities (-1.22 and -0.58), and moderate consumption adjustments of self-
produced food and leisure. Furthermore, farmers will hire less labor (-5.71 and -3.26) and sell 
more off-farm labor (9.83 and 5.62) to a great extent, particularly in the case of a market 
surplus tax. Although, the tax induced shadow price reactions are relatively large (-1.42 and   
-0.81), the production decisions seem to be determined by the respective direct components. 
On the consumption side, the very elastic adjustment of market goods caused by an increasing 
market surplus tax can be explained by an additional direct Hicksian substitution effect. In 
contrast to the input tax, the market surplus tax induces a lower (decision) price for the self-
produced good enforcing the household members to substitute self-produced goods for market 
commodities.       
Except for the labor market responses, the land tax (tG) elasticities are around zero, 
especially due to very low shares of land assets, which leads to a adjustment of the internal 
wage (-0.08). A value-added tax (tvat) leads via the indirect (shadow wage) component to a 
slight increase in the supply and demand of production goods, and to a relatively large 
decrease of the household’s market consumption (-0.87). However, the consumption of self-
produced goods does increase (0.33). Since the value of self-produced food cannot be 
observed and taxed (see above) the Hicksian cross price effect ‘works’ against the (tax-
induced) negative income effect, and lets households substitute self-produced consumption 
goods for market goods.  
In the case of perfectly competitive labor markets (table 4), the income tax (ty) induces 
(as expected) no production adjustments. While the adjustments of the consumption pattern 
are similar to the non-separable model version, net off-farm labor supply increases to a greater 
extent (4.32) as in the case of non-separability (3.07). Likewise, farm household adjustments 
of an increasing wage tax (tw) are very similar to the non-separable version. We only find 
remarkable differences regarding the net off-farm labor supply.   
include table 4  
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As expected, most important differences between the two model versions are found regarding 
the market surplus and input taxes (tms and tv). We only find slightly larger production and 
labor market responses within the separable framework, but the consumption effects differ to 
a remarkable extent in most cases. This is particularly true for the demand of market and self-
produced commodities. Farm household responses of land (tG) and value-added taxes (tvat) 
are very similar to the non-separable version. This seems to be mainly caused by the low 
shadow price elasticities.  
 To conclude, the designed tax instruments partly induce different allocation effects 
within both the non-separable and the separable model version. In both model versions, the 
production effects of the standard tax instruments (income, wage and value added taxes) are 
ignorable or non-existing, but their consumption and labor market effects are remarkable. In 
addition, tax induced labor market adjustments differ between the two model versions. 
Regarding the agricultural taxes, we find considerable production, consumption and labor 
market responses to increasing market surplus and input taxes, but only slight adjustments to 
an increasing land tax. Furthermore, the farm household’s adjustments differ between the 
non-separable and separable model in regard the consumption and labor market decisions.   
The overall small differences in tax induced production responses between the two 
model versions are mainly caused by the very low labor price elasticities of output supply and 
input demand
16, ranging between -0.01 and -0.04. That is, the low labor price elasticities limit 
the impact of the shadow wage effects on farmers production plans to a great extent. Hence, 
labor market imperfections do not influence tax induced production adjustments in Poland’s 
farming sector to a considerable extent. Obviously, the surprisingly low production responses 
to changing tax policies seems to be technological determined.  
Considering these empirical results, we have to somewhat weaken our conclusions 
drawing from the theoretical analysis (see section ‘Comparative Static’) – at least for the 
Polish case. Since, the income, wage, and value-added taxes obviously imply ignorable 
production effects, even in the case of imperfectly competitive labor markets, when compared 
with both market surplus and input tax, they seem to be superior to these specific agricultural  
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taxes from the efficiency point of view. Analogously, since a land tax does not induce 
remarkable production effects, even in the case of non-separability, it seems to be superior to 
market surplus and input taxes.    
Concluding Remarks 
This paper provides a comparative static analysis and econometric estimation of farm 
households’ production, consumption, and labor market decisions under alternative tax 
policies. A non-separable farm household model is constructed implying increasing per-unit 
costs of accessing labor markets and thus accounting for labor market constraints. To 
explicitly control for tax-induced adjustments related to labor market imperfections we 
compare the results to those derived from a separable approach assuming perfect labor 
markets. In detail, we analyze an income and a value-added tax, which are the usual tax tools 
of non-peasant households but often difficult to implement in agricultural households. Thus, 
we also examine an off-farm income tax as well as typical agricultural taxes (market surplus, 
input, and land taxes), which are treated as surrogates for standard taxes. 
 Theoretical results suggest that when labor market imperfections occur most tax-
induced responses are ambivalent mainly due to shadow price effects. This is especially true 
for the labor market reactions and for the production responses to most tax tools under study, 
while a decreasing demand for consumption goods seems to be probable in several cases. 
Furthermore, tax-induced allocation effects may differ between the non-separable and the 
separable model version indicating the potential impact of labor market constraints on farm 
household responses to tax policies. In particular, standard taxes as well as a land tax may 
imply production adjustments in the case of non-separability. Econometric analysis using 
individual household data from Mid-West Poland (1991-1994) indicates remarkable 
allocation effects induced by market surplus and input taxes, which differ between the two 
model versions. In contrast, production responses to standard and land taxes are negligible or 
non-existing in both imperfect and perfect labor markets, while labor market adjustments 
slightly differ between the two models.  
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Methodologically, the analysis shows that using partial equilibrium or separable 
household models to analyze tax policies might be inappropriate when market failures create 
non-separabilities, as will be expected when labor markets are imperfect. Further, the model 
accounts for several kinds of labor market imperfections (e.g. institutional restrictions or fixed 
and variable transaction costs in accessing labor markets), and is applicable for different labor 
market regimes, including the case that households both hire on-farm and sell off-farm labor. 
Finally, all empirical results presented here are based on a theoretical consistent estimation of 
farm household behavior. In particular, applying a new method proposed by Koebel, Falk and 
Laisney allows us to ensure global convexity, which is always a problem when estimating 
flexible profit functions.        
From a policy perspective, the work contributes to the on-going debate over 
agricultural tax reforms and the implementation of well-defined tax systems, respectively in 
less-developed and transition economies. In contrast to most studies, our theoretical results 
advise that income and value-added taxes are not necessarily superior to agricultural taxes in 
the sense of optimal taxation theory (Diamond and Mirrless). Analogously, since a land tax 
might imply production adjustments and thus efficiency losses, it is not clearly superior to 
market surplus or input taxes as most studies suggest. However, the empirical results show 
that in case of Poland standard and land taxes imply remarkably lower production effects 
compared to market surplus and input taxes. Thus, the  superiority of standard and land taxes 
seems to be sustained.   
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Tables 
Table 1: Theoretical tax effects – non-separable model version 
Tax  Farm  Household  Labor Market  Internal 
Wage 







ty  ?  ?  ?  ?  (-)  (-)  ?  ?  ?  ?  - 
tw  +  +  +  (+)  (-)  (-)  ?  -  ?  ?  - 
tms  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ? 
tv  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ? 
￿
G  +  +  +  (+)  (-)  (-)  ?  -  +  +  - 
tvat  ?  ?  ?  ?   ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ? 
Notes: It is assumed that goods are not inferior and technologies are not regressive.  
+/-  = clear, increase/decrease;  
(+)/(-)  = unclear, but most likely an increase/decrease  
(assuming labor and variable inputs are complements, and consumption goods are net-substitutes);  
 ? = unclear. 
 
 
Table 2: Theoretical tax effects – separable model version  
Tax  Farm  Household  Labor 
market 




ty  /  /  /  /  (-)  (-)  ?  ? 
tw  +  +  +  (+)  (-)  (-)  ?  ? 
tms  -  -  -  -   (-)  ?  (-)  (+) 
tv  -  -  (-)  -  -  -  -  (+) 
￿
G  /  /  /  /  -  -  -  + 
tvat  /  /  /  /  -  ?  ?  ? 
Notes: It is assumed that goods are not inferior, technologies are not regressive, and farmers are net supplier of 
labor.  
/ = clear, no effect 
+/-  = clear, increase/decrease;  
(+)/(-)  = unclear, but most likely an increase/decrease  
(assuming labor and variable inputs are complements, and consumption goods are net-substitutes);  
 ? = unclear.  
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Table 3: Tax elasticities – non-separable model version 
Tax  Farm  Household  Labor Market  Internal 
Wage 







ty  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.76  -0.46  -0.10  -1.27  2.19  3.07  -1.32 
tw  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.03  -0.34  -0.22  0.05  -2.84  -2.04  -1.84  -0.71 
tms  -0.14  -0.26  -0.06  -0.35  -1.22  0.18  -0.42  -5.71  9.83  13.78  -1.42 
tv  -0.14  -0.24  -0.05  -0.33  -0.58  -0.32  -0.24  -3.26  5.62  7.88  -0.81 
￿
G  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.06  -0.03  -0.02  -0.32  0.56  0.78  -0.08 
tvat  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.87  0.33  -0.06  -0.75  1.29  1.81  -0.19 
Notes: Tax elasticities are calculated at tj=0 using the sample mean values of the relevant variables. 
 
Table 4: Tax elasticities – separable model version  
Tax  Farm  Household  Labor 
Market 




ty  /  /  /  /  -0.62  -0.36  -0.13  4.32 
tw  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.04  -0.47  -0.31  0.09  -3.09 
tms  -0.16  -0.32  -0.10  -0.40  -0.58  0.61  -0.58  19.41 
tv  -0.15  -0.27  -0.07  -0.36  -0.14  -0.05  -0.21  7.23 
￿
G  /  /  /  /  -0.02  -0.01  -0.03  1.10 
tvat  /  /  /  /  -0.78  0.39  -0.08  2.55 
Notes: Tax elasticities are calculated at tj=0 using the sample mean values of the relevant variables.  
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Table A1: Characteristics of the sample  
Variable  Unit  Mean  Minimum  Maximum  Standard- 
deviation 
PaXa  1000 PLZ  96878  825  1077813  120790 
PcXc  1000 PLZ  53959  1275  843590  85470 
PvXv  1000 PLZ  49545  5291  285904  38660 
Xl  hours  3569  550  9587  1814 
Xl
h  hours  124  0  1742  263 
Xl
s  hours  612  0  4050  1027 
Xl
f  hours  3445  492  9476  1799 
PaCa  1000 PLZ  17567  3267  71479  10358 
PmCm  1000 PLZ  36953  3833  264270  29649 
Cl  hours  15615  3515  40124  7023 
Land   hectare  9.9  1.1  94.6  9.9 
Capital   1000 PLZ  329090  21590  2727076  393807 
Notes: Calculations are based on IERiGZ (1995). PLZ= Zloty. 
 
Table A2: Parameter estimates and R





bI  1049 (1.70)  32161 (1.00) 
ai  1.25 (15.15)  0.86 (7.02) 
ki  177883 (1.96)  6855112 (0.46) 
R
2  0.854  0.733 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. 
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Table A3: Parameter estimates and R
2 - netput equations (restricted model) 
Parameters and R
2  Xa  Xc  Xl  Xv 
ai  48493108  -498681  -19700495  -6100683 
bia  23849540   
bic  6461318  1910093 
symmetric 
bil  -4118725  -762363  1494200   
biv  -26192133  -7609051  3386888  30414296 
diG  -3829442  4267996  -3067833  -6184582 
diK  230517311  13561871  -5128966  -64778534 
gGG  313159 
gGK=gKG  439521 
gKK  -59634912 
R
2  0.501  0.824  0.610  0.828 
Notes: The McElroy R
2 value of the system is 0.721.  
 
Table A3*: Parameter estimates and R
2 - netput equations (unrestricted model) 
Parameters and R
2  Xa  Xc  Xl  Xv 
ai  48616210 (8.06)  -1099787 (0.42)  -19777850 (12.94)  -6301388 (2.24) 
bia  12301102 (1.62)   
bic  21335732 (4.72)  -19909719 (4.03) 
symmetric 
bil  -6829212 (2.24)  4395793 (1.66)  -320156 (0.11)   
biv  -26807623 (5.38)  -5821805 (1.83)  2753575 (1.34)  29875853 (6.55) 
diG  -3917879 (5.34)  4355447 (13.09)  -3095062 (13.68)  -6207536 (15.79) 
diK  232006284 (11.78)  12039050 (1.31)  -4553301 (0.68)  -64306427 (5.66) 
gGG  316061 (4.42) 
gGK=gKG  408512 (0.23) 
gKK  -59936306 (1.19) 
R
2  0.513  0.829  0.605  0.828 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. The standard errors of the coefficients that have not been directly estimated are 
calculated with the formula of Klein (p. 258). The McElroy R
2 value of the system is 0.721.  
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Table A4: Parameter estimates and R
2 - budget share equations  
Parameters and R
2   Wa  Wm  Wl 
ai  -0.351 (4.57)  0.002 (0.01)  1.349 (6.08) 
bi  -0.057 (12.13)  -0.040 (5.01)  0.097 (8.94) 
gia  0.147 (11.39)    symmetric 
gim  0.115 (9.75)  0.092 (3.07)   
gil  -0.261 (13.48)  -2.07 (5.74)  0.486 (9.74) 
R
2  0.377  0.035  0.152 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. The standard errors of the coefficients that have not been directly estimated are 
calculated with the formula of Klein (p. 258). The McElroy R
2 value of the system is 0.234. We use for a0 the 
value 35, since it ‘produces’ the highest likelihood value of the AIDS Model.  
 
Table A5: Price elasticities – SNQ (restricted) Model  






Xa  0.249  0.067  -0.043  -0.274 
Xc  0.127  0.037  -0.014  -0.149 
Xl  0.086  0.016  -0.031  -0.070 
Xv  0.313  0.090  -0.040  -0.363 
 
 
Table A6: Price and Income elasticities – AIDS Model  





  Hicksian Elasticities  
Ca  -0.735  0.427  0.308 
Cm  0.218  -0.673  0.455 
Cl  0.030  0.086  -0.116 
  Marshallian Elasticities 
Ca  -0.754  0.390  0.116 
Cm  0.163  -0.781  -0.111 
Cl  -0.055  -0.079  -0.990 
 
  Income elasticities 
  Ca  Cm  Cl 
Income  0.248  0.729  1.125  
  33 
Endnotes 
                                                        
1 In their fundamental work, Diamond and Mirrless argue that production efficiency is desirable within an 
optimal taxation system, even if a full Pareto optimum is not achieved. Thus, tax tools that do not violate 
production efficiency should to be preferred unless there are administrative limitations or special distributional 
reasons restricting their use. 
2 Here, the income tax affects the position of both functions, with  ( )
*(.) 1 (.)
y f f t = -  and  ( )
*(.) 1 (.)
y g g t = - , 
while the wage tax affects only the position of the first, with  ( )
*(.) 1 (.)
w f f t = - . 
3 As noted before, direct labor market reactions result only for an income and a wage tax, since only these taxes 





















t ¶t ¶ =
























4 Note that the full income effect of a changed internal wage strictly equals zero. This follows from partial 
differentiation of the full income constraint with regard to the internal wage.    
5 Note, because all designed tax policies have to be interpreted as alternative tax instruments, it is assumed that 
the respective tax under consideration is the only tax policy applied to the farm household. 
6 On request, a detailed documentation of the comparative static is available from the authors.  
7 This functional form is also traded under the name of “symmetric generalized McFadden function”.   
8 For the households either sell or hire labor, we can not observe price differences that could indicate the 
occurrence of unobservable transaction costs. Thus, we use the information from the sub-sample of households 
that both sell and hire labor.   
9 The SNQ profit function is defined as follows (Kohli): 
( )
* * 1 * * * 1 1
,
2 2
i i ij i j ij i j jk j k
i PG i PG j PG i PG j R j R k R
r P w P P P R w R R p a b d g
-
Î Î Î Î Î Î Î
P = + + + å åå åå åå . 
10 The simultaneous nonlinear estimation of the translog total price index together with the demand system, 
which share the same set of coefficients, usually results in estimation problems (Michalek and Keyzer). In order 
to avoid these problems, as well as to avoid difficulties of approximating the translog price index by, say, a 
Stone index (Deaton and Muellbauer), we chose an iterative estimation procedure proposed by Michalek and 
Keyzer (p.145).   
11 Land prices used to calculate the values of land stem from Ostrowski.  
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12 Note the parameters of the fixed transaction costs reveal the “right” sign, but one of them only is statistically 
significant at 10% level. 
13 However, we found 56% of the parameters in the unrestricted model of statistical significance (see annex table 
A3*). Most of these parameters are similar to those of the restricted model.   
14 The weighting matrix is the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the Hessian, which can be derived 
from the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients. We use the Cholesky factorization to restrict 
the Hessian to be positive semi-definite.  Note, to retain convexity of the SNQ profit function, it is sufficient to 
minimize the difference between the estimated (unrestricted) b-coefficients and the (linearly independent) values 
of a restricted b-coefficient matrix (Koebel 1998). This procedure only allows to adjust the b-coefficients, while 
the approach mentioned above (Koebel, Falk, and Laisney 2000, 2003) adjusts all coefficients. Thus, the fit of 
the constrained model is much better, due to the flexibility of the other coefficients. Both approaches ‘produce’ 
the same b’s. 
15 On request the detailed derivation of the tax elasticities is available from the authors. 
16 A reason for this might be the very low output elasticity with respect to labor as reported in Brümmer, 
Glauben and Thijssen (p. 636) for Polish dairy farms.   
 